TITLE: “Fighting with one hand tied behind your back”: A case study of the US labor movement’s adoption of comprehensive immigration reform.¹

Author: Zach Baumgart, M.S., University of Wisconsin, Madison – zbaumgar@ssc.wisc.edu

Acknowledgements: First, I want to thank all of the participants of this project, for whom this project would never be possible. I’d like to thank my Master’s advisor Chad Goldberg, as well as Myra Marx Ferree, Joel Rogers, Michael Bell, Jane Collins and Pam Oliver for critiques and suggestions of my original thesis. Also, thanks to Adrienne Pagac and Peter Rickman for suggestions concerning my interview protocol. I’d also like to thank the innumerable number of fellow graduate students for their myriad suggestions during research seminars (Politics, Culture, and Society and Economic Sociology) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, as well as from other graduate classes. Finally, I’d like to thank Lindsey Vogelman for numerous suggestions throughout various stages of the entire project.

¹ The quote from this title came from Isaac, a labor leader from CTW. He was referring to the consequences of organizing without including or considering immigrant workers.
ABSTRACT

Shortly after Barack Obama’s victory in 2009, the American Federation of Labor and Change to Win formed a joint agreement advocating for comprehensive immigration reform. Within their Unity Plan, labor leaders advocated for a comprehensive legalization program, an independent commission to assess immigration flows, a secure worker authorization mechanism, improvement of temporary worker programs and rational operational control of the border. What went into the development of this statement, and how did the broader labor movement receive it? Also, did the release of this policy signal a step towards social movement unionism, or was it still business unionism as usual. Using institutional ethnographic methods, I outline the context, development, relevant outcomes and implications of this statement. I interviewed thirteen key experts and leaders of the labor movement, and closely analyzed an assortment of documents from across major national union organizations. Most importantly, I found that the development of this statement was not necessarily sporadic or motivated by justice, at least originally. Instead, it marked both a pragmatic shift in how leaders understood the ethno-racial make-up of the US labor market, and their later choice to embrace, rather than resist, those changes. The statement itself was crafted from a lengthy process that began a year before Obama’s election, but its release became especially exigent with his promise to address immigration reform within his first year in office. I also show that this shift in opinion was not accompanied by a shift in organizational function; its leaders were more likely to inform its interested members and outside experts about the statement rather than meaningfully include those members in the process. In the end, while a comprehensive immigration policy never formed in congress, the coalition-building that the policy precipitated helped form a necessary alliance among national labor affiliations and interested immigrant rights advocates.
Introduction

Comprehensive immigration reform is considered by many impossible. Politicians glazing over the human aspect of immigration speak of “securing” the southern border from increased “flows” of immigration, as if those immigrating are akin to a tsunami, a disaster. Local immigration legislation has descended into desperate nativism, sanctioning policing strategies that reward racist heuristics. Policies designed to prevent immigration are aimed at the overestimated source of illegal border crossings, when the main source of undocumented immigration arises from overstaying visas. Regardless, the political and economic consequences of immigration legislation affect the lives of all American residents, both immigrant or otherwise.

American unions have been aware of the economic significance of immigration for nearly their entire existence. In their earliest years, unions continually supported anti-immigration legislation, and used exclusionary measures to support their own organizational structures (Mink, 1986). But as workers from other occupations such as manufacturing sought fair working conditions, supporting a difference between native and immigrant became less tenable. The Congress for Industrial Organizations (CIO)2 adopted pro-immigration positions long before their trade-skill centered brothers3 in the American Federation of Labor (AFL), suggesting a link between either profession or organizational models and pro-immigration policies. After merging in 1955, however, the AFL-CIO adopted a protectionist immigration policy for decades after.

As unionization rates across industries declined sharply in 1970s and 80s, continuing even today, national leaders of American unions began to reconsider their position. Organizing, an afterthought of past AFL-CIO presidents, became the central concern of John Sweeney after his election in 1995. His election signaled a potential shift away from business unionism, with its focus on servicing of grievances, to social movement unionism, with its greater focus on organizing new members and political advocacy (Voss & Sherman, 2000). Associated with this shift, leaders began to re-think their long standing conservative position on immigration. After all, the percentage of immigrant workers was highest in those occupations that boasted the largest numbers of unionized employees in the past (manufacturing, and many low-wage service positions). Ignoring, or worse, alienating immigrant workers was detrimental to the efforts of being a politically relevant entity.

In my paper, I analyze this effort to change in the twin contexts of their effort to reverse the decline of unionization, and of their process of adopting a new immigration policy position. I do this by closely analyzing the culmination of labor’s transition towards progressive immigration reform: the development and implementation of a joint agreement on immigration reform between two of the largest American labor organizations, the AFL-CIO and Change to Win (CTW). I draw my analysis from both archival evidence and in-depth interviews with labor experts ranging from the state and national

2 Because of the large number of references to union organizations and different policies, I summarized all acronyms used in this paper into Appendix C.

3 Based on the early forms of unionizing, “brothers” is unfortunately more accurate. Women were excluded along with immigrants and non-Whites in the early foundations of most unions. As with immigration, union actors were late to address gender-based discrimination as well (Mink, 1986).
level. After briefly discussing my methods, I will discuss the context and development of what some labor leaders called their “Unity Plan”, and follow up with its immediate outcomes. Finally, I consider these efforts in the context of attempts to shift towards social movement unionism. I argue that the development of the plan showed evidence of social movement unionism through its discursive shift towards a united worker identity and an increased emphasis on external coalition building and internal collaboration; but it demonstrated mixed evidence in regards to grass-roots organization, in that it’s designers failed to include members and interested workers in the development of the plan itself.

**Methods:**

Before interviewing leaders, I analyzed immigration in the labor movement at three different progressively more detailed levels. First, I broadly surveyed the way unions discussed immigration across a large number of national unions across the US. Second, I collected immigration policy documents from a sample of these unions (listed at the end of the “References” Section), for closer analysis of how individual unions codify their positions into formal documents. Finally, I closely analyzed the Unity Plan itself, variations of it, and the policy statement from which it was based upon (an Economic Policy Institute (EPI) Report written by Ray Marshall, 2009). I centered interviews around the Unity Plan if interviewers were familiar with it and its development. If they were not, I discussed other issues relevant to immigration and policy development. For more details on the choices made for selecting documents, see Appendix A.

I conducted thirteen, one to three hour interviews with decision makers in the AFL-CIO, CTW, and other unaffiliated (UA) sources (whom provided additional verification of what union leaders claimed, as well as perspective on both organizations). All identities are confidential; when quotes are associated with names of interviewees, only the genders (with purposefully gendered pseudonyms) and organizational identities are disclosed. I used purposive sampling techniques; I drew sources based on their organizational affiliation, occupational specialization (in the capacity of their position) and demographic characteristics (especially gender and ethnicity). I interviewed people one to three times between the end of July 2010 and early November, 2010; additional interviews for the same people only occurred for individuals that did not finish questions in one session. I conducted all interviews in person or on the phone, depending on location and availability of interviewees. I digitally recorded interviews for transcription either with stock recording software available on a PC (in person), or PowerGramo Skype recording software (by phone). Appendix C provides a complete overview of my interview protocol.

**The Early Historical Context of Immigration and Labor**

As stated before, national union actors have engaged with immigration policy since workers first began organizing in the early nineteenth century (Mink, 1986; Fine & Tichenor, 2009; Burgoon, et al., 2010). At the national level, supporters of conservative policies backed their position with both economic arguments (that immigration depressed wages and displaced native workers) and racist attitudes (reinforced by stereotypes of immigrant inferiority); this often translated into exclusionary organizing among trade unions. While over time, immigration opinions varied locally and nationally, four contextual challenges jointly shaped how local unions made organizing decisions. First, decision making
among American unions is highly decentralized, and affiliation with the AFL-CIO or CTW is voluntary. As a result, local unions ultimately decide their own organizing strategies (Lipset & Marks, 2000), and locals are not required to adopt the policies of the national (or state) AFL-CIO (Katz, 1993; Voss & Sherman, 2000; Mink, 1987; Milkman, 2006). Second, institutional barriers, such as anti-labor laws that significantly hinder the ability of unions to organize (Rogers, 1990) and a lack of a strong political ally (Lipset & Marks, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1990), challenge the ability of unions to function in and out of the political arena. Third, neoliberal economic theorists dominate political arguments concerning unions; by regulating wages and employment, these theorists opposed unions for their generally negative impact on the economy as a whole (Kaufman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Western, 1995). Finally, and most importantly for immigrant workers, nativism and racism dominated early rationalizations of exclusion, especially among trade unions (Lipset & Marks, 2000); at its simplest level, native workers viewed immigrant workers as different, and in many cases, visibly distinguishable due to their different skin color or ethnic identity (Mink, 1986). This is no longer as overt as it was in the past, but examples of discrimination-based exclusion still arise, as you will see in my Discussion. These structured circumstances supported an exclusionary, anti-immigrant attitude within most unions. These exclusionary union actors rationalized their actions by pointing towards immigrant workers’ alleged resistance to organizing (Milkman, 2006; Milkman, 2007). In regards to the source of most immigrant workers in the past decade, Latin America, proponents of exclusion cited four rationalizations. First, that because Latin Americans could not speak English fluently, it would be difficult to strategically coordinate protests or organizing efforts. Second, exclusionists cited a fundamental mismatch between the values of the numerous diverse cultures of Latin America and that of working class Americans (most importantly, a lower receptivity to union principles). Third, native workers assumed most immigrant workers were sojourners, solely concerned with earning enough money to return home better off than when they left (Bonacich, 1972). Lastly, the precarious legal position among immigrant workers (documented or otherwise) made unionization more challenging, and thus discouraged rationally risk-averse immigrant workers away from being organized (Smith, Avendaño & Ortega, 2009; see also Cranford, 2005).

Moving Away from a Legacy of Exclusion

Overtime, as policy makers re-framed immigration as inevitable, labor actors began to shift away from exclusion (Canales, 2003). Increased economic globalization fostered increased industrial and occupational displacement, especially among classically unionized industries (McMichael, 2008; Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, 2004; Cohen & Hurd, 1998). Through international treaties like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), immigration became more attractive to those considering it. NAFTA in particular led to a slow shift in the demographic make-up of U.S. workers (Schwartzman, 2009). For other industries, however, migration was never an option; for instance, the transportation industry still needed drivers, small businesses could not afford moving and high-tech firms benefitted from an educated workforce and inter-firm proximity (Saxenien, 1996). Thus to compete with those industries conducive to outsourcing, smaller firms often made heavy cuts to their labor-force, including the purposeful employment of undocumented immigrants to circumvent minimum wage laws and hours restrictions (Rogers, 1990; Nadadur, 2009).
Concurrently, intensified immigration enforcement practices hindered labor organizing, including workplace raids and deportations (Kirchoff, 2007; Pear & Luo, 2007; Haus, 2002; National Immigration Law Center, 2007; Canales, 2003). Taken together, these global changes (and more importantly, recognizing those changes) motivated exclusionist unions to reconsider their position on immigration (Fine & Tichenor, 2009; Haus, 2002; Canales, 2003). Also, unions began to link their position on immigration with the pervading problem of membership decline (see also Chun, 2008). With the 1995 election of John Sweeney to the head of the AFL-CIO in, unions formalized their shift from service (focusing solely on the grievances of members) to organizing (actively shifting strategies towards expanding their unionization rate nationally) (Bernard & Piven, 1995). Also, by addressing immigration and de-unionization together, they realized a new potential to increase their bargaining power and harmonize their basic goal of improving working conditions for everyone. Their previous rationales for excluding Latin American immigrant workers became obsolete (Voss & Sherman, 2000). First, organizers began creating effective strategies for recruiting non-English speaking workers; bilingual organizers became more common (Rooks, 2004), Spanish-speaking advocates from other social movements got involved (Ganz, et al., 2004), and local unions began publishing their newsletters and websites in multiple languages. Second, union leaders (assisted by researchers) systematically invalidated the “organizing resistant” perception of Latin American culture; most importantly, they realized that most Latin Americans viewed unions more favorably than most US workers (Milkman, 2007; Cohen, & Hurd, 1998). In fact, Latin American workers were less fearful of the potential negative consequences of organizing than they were in their sending countries; here, they only risked losing their jobs rather than (literally) their lives (Milkman, 2006). Third, many Latin American immigrant workers were more concerned with funding their family’s immigration to the US, rather than their own immigration back (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 1997). Finally, considering the outcome of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (Walsh, 2003), the conflict between immigration status and labor rights unfortunately remains a challenge; however, leaders and organizers have developed strategies that account for these disadvantages rather than simply yielding to them as they did in the past (Smith, et al., 2009).

Taken together, American unions collectively changed their immigration organizing goals and strategies significantly since their earliest days of exclusionary unionism. Today, advocates of the American Labor Movement often use social movement rhetoric, emphasizing inclusive policies and worker solidarity. Internally, union reformers began to reconfigure their organization to accommodate democratic participation rather than top-down servicing of their members (Voss & Sherman, 2000; Lopez, 2004; Ganz, et al., 2004). Of course, wide variation exists (Dreiling & Robinson, 1998; Lipset & Marks, 2000). Unions formulate their organizing strategies based on their specific regional, industrial, and occupational interests, which tend to vary quite widely (Mink, 1986; Cohen & Hurd, 1998; Clemens, 1996). For instance, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) represents more immigrant workers than most other unions (Martin, 2008), and along with others like it (such as the Union of Needletrades,

---

5 In fact, this has become so common among Latin American (especially Mexican) parents (usually mothers) that it has led to a prevalence of fragmented families resulting from the parent(s)’s decision to stay (Zhou, 2003; Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 1997; Rumbaut, 1997).
Industrial and Textile Employees & Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (UNITE HERE) and the United Farm Workers of America (UFWA), adopted liberal immigration policies fairly early (Haus, 2002). Other unions, such as the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC) and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, have not demonstrated the same kind of commitment to this new inclusion. This decentralized, voluntary structure fosters organizational specificity, but also inherent ideological divisions (Lipset & Marks, 2000).^6^  

**Setting the Stage for a Comprehensive Plan**

Given the historical context and burgeoning efforts toward change, several important events shaped the immediate political context of the Unity Plan. As stated before, the supreme court decision of *Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Review Board* in 2002 was the first. In this case, the NLRB awarded an undocumented immigrant worker, Jose Castro, with back-pay as a result of being unlawfully fired based on his immigration status. Hoffman Plastics challenged the ruling, on the grounds that Castro’s employment was unlawful, based on the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986; the court agreed with Hoffman. Justice Rehnquist writing in the majority opinion of Hoffman stated, “We therefore conclude that allowing the Board to award back-pay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA. It would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations” (*Hoffman Plastics, Inc v. NLRB*, 2002). While the justices did not believe their ruling obviated labor rights among undocumented immigrant workers, their ruling codified otherwise. Many labor leaders considered this ruling to be a legal declaration that immigration law trumped labor law. (Walsh, 2003).

Three years later, as unions were beginning to embrace immigration reform, the second significant event occurred: in 2005, during an annual convention among labor leaders of the AFL-CIO, seven major national unions officially separated to form a new affiliation, called Change to Win (CTW). Citing irreconcilable ideological differences associated with organizing, as well as an outdated organizational

----

^6^ Emblematic of this shift was the radical, well-known and (most importantly) successful Justice for Janitors campaign beginning in 1985 (Milkman, 2006; Waldinger et al., 1998). That campaign ultimately succeeded due to its innovative tactics, a mix of NLRB and community organizing, a participatory decision making process, and its active grass-roots participants (see also Lopez, 2004). Following that campaign, a growing number of organizing efforts among immigrant workers utilized other strategies than those required for classic NLRB drives (Martin, 2008). For instance, Fine (2007) and her colleagues (Fine, Grabelsky & Narro, 2008) chronicled how immigrant workers increasingly form worker centers, which emphasize communal solidarity through regional activism (see also Needleman, 1998). These organizations provide a general support network designed to assist immigrant workers who lack resources and/or a working knowledge of American labor markets (Fine, 2007; Fine, et al, 2008; Camou, 2010). By focusing on communal and cultural identity rather than that of the workplace or industry, worker centers encourage a permanent collective affiliation unaffected by employment status. Also, because these centers are so new and reflect a very different organizational model than that of most unions, they are less inhibited by anti-union legislation, enabling a decidedly larger strategic repertoire from which to address labor grievances. While NLRB organizing efforts occur more frequently, Martin (2008) found alternative forms of organizing to be more successful (Martin, 2008). Most importantly, while union actors originally opposed worker centers for various reasons, most have now recognized their myriad benefits through formal national partnerships (Fine, 2007; Fine, et al. 2008; Needleman, 1998).
structure, CTW wanted to specifically use radical organizing tactics to reverse labor’s decline. Specifically, they planned on greater strategic centralization, significantly more resources dedicated to organizing (80% of its operating budget, as opposed to the AFL-CIO’s proposed 30%), and a stronger mechanism for policy enforcement. For the AFL-CIO, the split was a significant loss; nearly half of their then total worker membership had left (Masters, Gibney, & Zagenczyk, 2006). For many labor advocates, the symbolic significance of a formally split labor movement was impossible to ignore. While disaffiliation with the AFL-CIO by itself is not necessarily extraordinary (the UBC, for instance, has altered its national organizational affiliation several times, and the largest national union in the US, the National Education Association, has never affiliated with the AFL-CIO), the formation of an independent national labor affiliation of independent national unions had not occurred since the creation of the CIO in 1938.

Labor advocates have historically emphasized the importance of a unified labor movement in both its basic ideology and its organizing logic, reasoning that anything less than total cooperation symbolized a fundamental division. After the division, if reunification was not a solution, demonstrating a shared commitment to the same policies was at least an exceptionally important second choice.

Given these two significant events, the first chance for a transforming labor movement to express their commitment to a new, progressive immigration policy finally arrived with the introduction of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act in 2006. While surely not identical to the newly forming liberal position among labor’s policy makers, the legislation was an important opportunity for labor leaders to demonstrate their support for comprehensive immigration reform despite their recent organizational division. Unfortunately, while both organizations supported liberal immigration reform, they were split on the bill (Holland, 2007; Weiner, 2007). The AFL-CIO and some unions of CTW opposed the legislation, mostly because of its extended guest worker program, which AFL-CIO leaders have opposed for decades. On the other hand, other unions in CTW supported the legislation, mostly because they reasoned that the legalization of an estimated twelve million undocumented workers trumped the other negative provisions. As Cathy of the AFL-CIO explained, “two [unions, the SEIU and UNITE HERE], … were supporting the McCain-Kennedy compromise, [while] 58 unions were not.” Ultimately, with continued revisions as it passed between houses, the bill failed; though mostly a result of irreconcilable partisan differences, the divided position of national labor organizations was not lost among political actors, labor or otherwise.

Taken together, labor was legally disadvantaged, organizationally divided and had just experienced a political division that could jeopardize their political legitimacy. Labor leaders needed to critically re-examine their immigration reform strategies. Luckily for them, Barak Obama won the presidency in 2008; after eight years of a president that prevented unionization of government offices in the name of national security (Wendland, 2004), that appointed anti-union officials to the NLRB and Department of Labor (Twomey, 2008), and that continually condoned immigration raids that permanently damaged

---

7 I am not considering the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, as this bill was debated while the AFL-CIO was together, and did not prove as divisive as CIRA. In this sense, CIRA was more formative in the development of the Unity Plan, which was significant for its shared agreement between all labor leaders (those of the AFL-CIO and CTW).

8 While this may seem to be evidence that they were not changing their position, the AFL-CIO continues to oppose guest worker programs now for the negative effects on all workers rather than just American workers.
organizing efforts (Smith, et al., 2009), labor advocates were excited for the change, to say the least (Gross, 2008). With Obama’s presidency came promises for upholding labor’s interests and for the development of an immigration bill that addressed labor’s persistent grievances against belligerent employers, within his first year of taking office (Baker, 2008). Obama’s first pro-labor action, appointing long-time labor advocate Hilda Solis to Secretary of Labor, vindicated labor’s support and provided hope for future actions in their favor (Langfitt, 2008). Shortly after that, he ended an ongoing legal dispute over a Department of Homeland Security rule that precipitated indiscriminate layoffs of “suspected” undocumented immigrants (Gaus, 2006). After two years of legal battles in and out of court, Obama rescinded what was referred to as the “No-Match Rule” rule with an executive order. He seemed to be moving fast on issues relevant to labor, and it was only a matter of time before his campaign promise of federal immigration reform came into focus. As the end of his first year approached, immigrant rights groups pushed Obama to accomplish something; labor leaders needed to be prepared for that day, and avoid the missteps that contributed to the failure of past immigration reform efforts.

Development of the Unity Plan

Fortunately, labor had already begun developing a jointly agreed upon policy position. Following the failed 2007 immigration debates, the AFL-CIO and CTW realized that they needed to regroup and be prepared for future policies. Matt, an unaffiliated expert, explained, “one of the main reasons that the [2007] legislation failed was that the advocates for comprehensive immigration reform were divided and if we could get people together behind a common agenda, we’d have a much better chance of getting it passed.” Cathy (AFL-CIO) also elaborated, “the labor movement being divided really meant that workers didn’t have a voice at the table, because legislatures had an easy way out of dealing with these issues. They said, ‘look, you guys are divided, come back when you’re not divided’.” This division, though surely not an even split, was enough to shut labor out of the conversation, thus demanding labor actors to be more cooperative for any future efforts. In planning for the next immigration proposal, labor actors acted preemptively, as Allen of the AFL-CIO describes “[then AFL-CIO] President Sweeney started the [immigration] task force a year ahead of that [Unity Plan] coming out with anticipation that …, at some point, comprehensive immigration was going to have to come up again.”

But to reiterate, union variation in opinion and interests matters. Agreeing on a plan that adequately met the needs of the hundreds of unions across the country was complicated. A simple meeting of the Executive Councils of the two federations would be inadequate to achieve broad consensus across practically every industry, occupation, and geographical region across the US. Luckily, leaders had organized another immigration task before, as Robert of CTW describes, “it really goes back to 1999 when we introduced a resolution to the AFL-CIO convention in Los Angeles to put the AFL-CIO … on record as being for immigration reform and supportive of immigrants. Then early 2000, John Sweeney … named the committee of which [included]… the SEIU, … HERE, the Farm Workers (UFWA), and UFCW [United Food and Commercial Workers]. And we drafted the resolution that went to the Executive Council that laid out a position of the AFL-CIO on immigration reform.” This original committee, made up of leaders that were now split by national affiliation, facilitated future immigration discussion, including the development of the Unity Plan itself.
To begin the formalization of a united policy, labor leaders needed a figurehead that both understood the political challenge of passing immigration legislation, and could garner support from labor and non-labor advocates alike. They not only wanted a plan that unions of the AFL-CIO and CTW could agree upon, but also could garner the support of other non-affiliated and even opposing organizations. To accomplish what would become an eighteen month task, they recruited former U.S. Secretary of Labor (1977-1981) and long-time labor ally Ray Marshall. His unaffiliated position awarded him the ability to develop a policy that could be supported by any interested organization, without fear that he was simply an official voice from a labor affiliate.

He began his development by combining his years of political experience and policy expertise with numerous meetings with interested parties (especially the AFL-CIO, but also CTW and numerous immigrant rights groups). He then wrote his report under the organizational auspices of the Economic Policy Institute (Marshall, 2009). As Matt (UA) described, Marshall wanted to use his EPI Report to build consensus with other groups, and draw out opposition in advance. His report included five main components, ordered roughly in terms of their significance for a comprehensive immigration policy. Most importantly, Marshall and other labor leaders conceptualized these as individually ineffective; any one component implemented by itself would not effectively repair the “broken” immigration system.

1. **The creation of an independent federal agency to determine immigration needs.** Marshall reasoned that the determination of immigrant quotas had become too politicized, and hence must be determined instead by an independent body charged with determining the specific needs. This would be the linchpin for the entire policy proposal; by getting a bi-partisan determination of immigrant worker needs, all of the other components would be better implemented.

2. **A more humane system of border control, and more importantly, internal tracking of authorized immigrant workers.** Most importantly, enforcement should not focusing on making immigration more difficult with fences and complex surveillance systems. Instead, effective tracking systems should be emphasized, thus mitigating the largest source of undocumented immigration: overstaying of visas. Also, Marshall realized that a policy without a provision on border security would never get Republican support. Even so, he wanted to mitigate the all too common relationship between increased border security and increased danger to immigrants associated with that kind of undocumented immigration.

3. **An affective worker authorization system that empowered workers with a fairer system of verification.** Specifically, he wanted to take the task of verification out of the hands of

---

9 While describing this policy, I refer to Marshall as the author, and use singular pronouns accordingly. This is only to reflect the author of the report, not its developers. The policy was developed along with many national labor leaders and a few non-labor experts. In this sense, as stated before, Marshall was more of an architect working directly with clients rather than an artist commissioned to complete a fresco.

10 To be clear, I interviewed an individual who was not identified as a labor supporter, here named Yassin. He stated that in general, even though this policy did reach out to anti-labor political actors, it would likely not be supported by conservative policy makers. However, he recognized that any legislation that did not consider border enforcement or guest worker programs would be even less likely to be accepted.
employers, and into the hands of both workers and independent federal agencies. He argued that by making this change, the threat of immigration-based firings, and by extension discrimination based on ethnicity, would be minimized. Verification would be completed before employment, similar to the process of obtaining a passport before traveling. Most importantly, labor leaders reasoned that this kind of verification would make raids during labor organizing more difficult, and empower all workers with a greater sense of freedom.

4. *A reasonable adjustment of status for undocumented immigrants currently living in the United States.* This is easily the most contested policy suggestion proposed by Marshall, and more generally, is the source of the greatest political contention for every other iteration proposed immigration legislations in the past. More specifically, Marshall reasoned against the popular conservative solution of mass deportations, citing innumerable problems of past attempts, including innumerable logistical problems, tens of thousands of familial separations, and worse, rampant discrimination from enforcement agencies. But for legalization to work, it had to be clear that this was a one-time fix; but for it to be a one-time fix, one needed better methods for estimating future needs (with an independent federal agency), a better method for preventing undocumented immigration (better tracking of those here) and a better system for authorizing workers while minimizing discrimination (through a more effective authorization system).

5. *Improvement of, rather than expansion of, guest worker programs.* As a carrot for conservative politicians, Marshall addressed guest worker programs without advocating for their abolition, as labor leaders had commonly done in the past. Again, like the position on border enforcement, Marshall understood that without a provision for guest worker programs, a policy would never be received by their opponents. As a “compromise”, they advocated for the improvement of existing guest worker programs, such as greater enforcement of the limits of temporary workers, and a greater emphasis on ensuring their independent rights. However, he explicitly opposed the creation of new programs or their expansion; unless, of course, the independent commission judged otherwise.

With policy proposal in hand, Marshall, “went all over the country meeting with groups to see if they would support that framework, … [including] Latino groups, other immigrant groups, the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People], the Urban League, La Raza, and a whole host of local groups. … And they [also] succeeded, initially, with the task of uniting the AFL-CIO” (interview with Matt [UA]). While he initially worked with the AFL-CIO, as planned, Vanessa of CTW describes how her federation ultimately contacted Marshall with the intention of forming a joint agreement, “[UFCW] President Hansen initiated a discussion and reached out to the AFL-CIO. Ray Marshall had come in and he had already started talking a little bit about how we would bring labor together about a unified position for comprehensive immigration reform.”

Obviously, some unions disagreed with Marshall’s initial plan. Building trades were generally resistant, and the border patrol unions were suspicious of the provisions on legalization. In these instances, Marshall was persistent, and ultimately appealed to their trust in his long-term accomplishments in the labor movement,
“Sometimes the reason that they disagreed with what Marshall was doing was because he didn’t explain it enough, and sometimes they doubted the basic premise on which the framework was based. So he ironed that out, and of course, the main way you try to iron it out, and one of the reasons they asked him to do it, was because he had a long history with the labor movement, and they had some confidence that he understood it, and understood the various components. He understands the building trades, as well as the industrial unions, and the public employees’ unions, and he understood what their objectives were in each case, and he understood a lot about how they operate, and what their main concerns are. So he could show them how a comprehensive immigration reform which supports their basic agendas [works].” (Interview with Matt [UA]).

After gathering input from unions and garnering enough support, policy makers of the AFL-CIO wrote a shortened version of Marshall’s EPI Report tailored to their federation’s needs (full text in Appendix B). Colloquially referred to as the Unity Plan, they condensed his fifty plus page policy book into a two page proposal. CTW endorsed it, and both Marshall’s EPI Report and the Unity Plan were officially published in early 2009. For labor leaders, the timing of the release was almost too good. Namely, it occurred precisely when the mounting pressure on Obama to consider immigration reform signaled a need for labor to demonstrate their unified position. However, when I asked interviewees if the coincidental timing was actually intentional, few considered this the case. Mitchell (UA) summed up the common response, “I think they just reached that point in their negotiation where they felt comfortable coming up with a common set of principles that could be released,” or as Allen responded, “Well, I think that was kind of ... all of the stars aligning”. In fact, as Allen responds to a question about the disagreements related to the statement, this was one of the strengths of the process, “we weren’t up against like a wall that there was legislation pending on this. So we had kind of the comfort of saying, ‘here’s what we’re talking about on this, and here’s how this addresses our concerns.’”

Reception of Labor’s New Position

When the AFL-CIO and CTW released their statement in April of 2009, there was minimal action in congress (Preston & Greenhouse, 2009). On Jun 25, 2009, Obama held a bi-partisan meeting among members of congress and immigration experts, to discuss the future of immigration reform (Chaddock, 2009). Unfortunately, nothing substantive developed from that meeting; instead, it seemed to serve as a means of demonstrating Obama’s support for movement on reform. In its place, healthcare and the economic recession dominated political debates throughout 2009 and into the next two years of his presidency. Leaders of the labor movement, including those I spoke with, realized this and moved their own policy agendas towards his healthcare reform as well.

This is not to ignore what has already been accomplished in terms of more recent immigration reform. Obama staunchly supported the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, which, most importantly, would have created a relatively simplified path to citizenship for minors of undocumented immigrants in good academic and legal standing. After this Act failed to pass, Obama made an executive order that at least sanctioned that patch to citizenship for affected minors. Both of
these actions have not gone unnoticed by labor. But though these actions are ostensibly supported by labor’s Unity Plan, it is only a fraction of that plan. As Marshall and others made clear, splitting up their plan or any other kind of immigration reform for that matter, would fail to deal with immigration at all. As Marshall stated in his original EPI report, “While it is undoubtedly true that more effective immigration policies would not stop unauthorized migration to the United States, they could greatly reduce it. To be sure, we have no experience or evidence that proves unauthorized immigration can be controlled because we have never tried comprehensive immigration policies like those recommended in this report, which assumes that our proposals could dramatically reduce the future flow of undocumented workers” (EPI, 2009, 18).

But while supporting provisions for legalization among minors, Obama has also increased the number of raids and deportations among immigrant workers substantially relative to other presidents (Dade, 2012). Of course, these weren’t typical deportations and raids; after a record increase in deportations (1.5 million in his first term), he began prioritizing criminals, and raids were generally “silent” in the sense that they were completed without a paramilitary squad of Immigration Control and Enforcement agents. Later in his presidency, in 2011, he began a review of all deportations, to further stress his position on prioritizing criminal deportations. This may be too little too late, however.

Now, three years after the initial release of the Unity Plan and with a re-elected Democratic president, Obama has broached immigration reform once again, this time in a more substantial manner. Midway through February, 2013, he began substantially pushing for his comprehensive proposal for immigration reform that he had developed at the end of his first term (Building…, 2011). It includes some of the tenants of the Unity Plan, such as better enforcement, and a method for amnesty; but it also included measures that codified penalties against businesses who broke these rules, and few changes to measures that determined limits on immigration in general (such as an independent agency). Based on the wording of the policy, it seems that there was little dialogue between Obama’s policy proposal and labor’s Unity Plan, if labor leaders that advised him followed their Unity Plan without deviation. Of course, this was never the absolute intention of their Plan; yes, they wanted their plan to have a substantive impact, but it was also meant to provide a statement that all labor leaders supported, demonstrating their shared commitment to reform. But as Obama began to push his new policy (now facing foreseen stiff resistance from Republicans), labor in the face of current AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka, has been a staunch supporter (Trumka, 2013).

**Discussion: Implications of the policy within the Labor Movement**

As is apparent, the context of and building of the plan needed to be considered together to understand the significance of labor actors’ shift towards comprehensive immigration reform. But was the process of the Unity Plan’s development indicative of their efforts to shift towards social movement unionism? Sure, federal reform never arose during Obama’s first term, but the apparent reconciliation of a policy across union organizations was significant in itself. In aggregate, the policy was basically accepted, in

---

11 Several interviewees, when asked if this policy was meant more as a symbolic rather than substantive policy statement, adamantly the latter. Not to say it wasn’t symbolic, but the developers of the Unity Plan developed that statement for substantive reasons first, symbolic a seemingly distant second.
the sense that policies adopted by the AFL-CIO and CTW indirectly represent the interests of affiliated unions whom do not object. Their effort to create a shared language of support for the “worker” rather than the “American worker” seemed quite successful, fostering an inclusionary labor identity. Also, this was the first instance when all national union organizations (both federations and unions) were formally united in their support for progressive immigration reform. However, the method of the policy’s development was not necessarily indicative of a revolutionary structural shift towards social movement unionism.

Emphasis on Shared Identity – Labor leaders have been trying to push towards a more united labor movement that criss-crosses demographic boundaries. In this sense, the policy and its developers quite successfully pushed for this shared set of principles centering around immigration reform. Most importantly, the identity of “worker” was central to the discourse of both the policy statement itself, and the discussions with organizational leaders. In interviews, actors rarely mentioned “employees,” and when identifying their constituents specifically, they rarely referred to their “members”. Allen (AFL-CIO) argued that the labor movement, “is a part of a social movement as well, doing what’s right for workers in general,” and that unions do “what is socially right.” He continued, “why do we support international labor rights and other issues? Because it’s the right thing to do. If workers are treated badly somewhere else, they’ll be treated badly everywhere”.

To reiterate, the reversal of immigration conservatism was significant mainly because prior protectionist and nativist stances supported an idea of protecting the American worker. As such, many of those interviewed recognized that nativism and racism must be dealt with for any kind of consensus to be reached within the labor movement. At the end of our interview, Fred (AFL-CIO) discussed his exhaustion with racist members when dealing with immigration as an issue:

“It’s very dicey with the membership because of the historic racism, historic know-nothing-ism, nativism that you have to overcome, through tortuous education. And one of the efforts – [I was] in a little kind of discussion group in breakfast one morning about the issue of immigration, and some of the people there were kind of complaining or talking about [an] immigration system that would fine people who are here illegally and that ‘that ain’t right.’ And I said, ‘maybe it’s not right, but I think it’s a good idea. That way, you can separate the people who claim they are opposed to illegal immigrants because the law is the law. If you say, “okay, they broke the law, we’re gonna fine them 50 or 75 or 100 bucks, something reasonable, not ridiculous,” then that argument is gone.’ You know, they can complain that they should have been fined more or whatever but that, you know, it’s done. The law says now that they have paid their ticket, and so you get rid of that issue, which is a difficult issue to deal with, you know, they say, ‘it’s illegal’, you know, they say, ‘why don’t they do it the right way’ blah blah blah. And then it’s an issue that builds up. Get rid of that, then you get down to the racism. If all you’re left with is racial prejudice, then okay, then you say, ‘okay, you guys are bigots’, you know, ‘we’re never gonna agree, so I’m not gonna waste my time on that’ But if you’re only concerned about the fact that these people broke the law, then okay, that’s fine. Make ‘em pay their fine, get out of jail, get points on their driver
license or whatever, and move on. But that’s kind of the whole thing, you know, when you get into these debates with people and they make all these arguments, nobody will admit they’re a racist. And, you know, ‘illegal’, ‘they’re competing with U.S. for jobs’ it’s that kind of thing. You get all that away, and immigration reform could do that. Immigration reform ain’t gonna fix racism. But at least when you can separate people into the bigots and everybody else, then you’ve got a much more malleable and workable group of people.”

So for Fred and other interviewed leaders, as well as other labor advocates more broadly, it was not simply a belief of job theft that must be overcome, but the long standing racism that has plagued the labor movement for so many years.12

To support this new comprehensive plan, leaders prioritized the “worker” identity over all others. If people could connect on this simple foundational identity, the discussions and interactions with all others would be simplified and on the same level. For instance, Robert (CTW), responding to a question about native worker resistance to immigrant workers, stated:

“In the middle of a struggle, when people see these immigrants, they begin to understand, ‘well, they’re not that different from me.’ What they’re just saying is ‘they’re fighting against being mistreated. They’re fighting to be paid a fair wage. They want to be able to have better protections for the[ir] family.’ And so they begin to understand that these immigrants are not that different from them. They have the same dreams and the same goals. The same aspirations. And they begin to identify. And all of a sudden, that faceless immigrant becomes José or María or you name it.”

Ideologically, the shared struggles unify these groups of workers under a single banner. The stories of the abuses of employers in the midst of worker resistance are legion, and often involve employers’ use of classic divide and conquer tactics.13 In its place, organizing strategies and policies constructed by the labor federations assumed a collective identity, as was apparent in the Unity Plan. Vanessa (CTW) describes the norm of how most leaders thought,

“It is, for me, a dangerous approach to say, ‘US born workers are here and undocumented [immigrant] workers are here.’ This is the workplace, and this is the relationship to the employer. Now what we have to do is we have to build, one, a solidarity and understanding amongst all workers in that climate, and two, is make sure

---

12 Of course this also suggests at least three things, also common across interviewees. First, that “bigots” are beyond help, thus casting doubt on actors’ attempts to move towards a truly unified immigration policy that could overcome these differences. Second, by separating people into these two groups, he asserts that divisions may actually make reform more feasible than a unified movement would. Finally, this suggests that leaders are willing to move without the support of their members if they feel members’ opinions are wrong (in this case morally).

13 I cannot overstate how often interviewees invoked images of division and defeat to rationalize policy decisions and organizing techniques. Many leaders used concrete examples, ranging from small organizing efforts in specific shops to national campaigns composed of hundreds of workers. In some cases, it was a palpable fear of any kind of division.
people, all workers understand that they have common interests and common values that they need to protect when someone else is attacking those interests and those rights and protections, when it comes down to it. And so the approach we take is, no, there is not one strategy for U.S. born workers and another for undocumented workers. The approach is that they are all workers.”

Extending this effort to focus on a shared identity into the policy statement itself, there is specific language to deal with the potential for discrimination in immigration policies. While outlining recommended worker authorization mechanisms, the authors of the Unity Plan paid attention to include language on discrimination: “A secure and effective worker authorization mechanism is one that determines employment authorization accurately while providing maximum protection for workers, contains sufficient due process and privacy protections and prevents discrimination” (my emphasis). It was a central goal to harmonize labor and immigration rights in the passage of immigration reform legislation, to further discourage procedural discrimination, and again, embody this shared identity of worker. Cathy (AFL-CIO) made this explicitly clear:

Cathy: “We’ve always said that immigration enforcement cannot trump labor standards enforcement or labor law enforcement, which is what happens now. ... If you look at the Hoffman Plastic decision ... it’s clear that the court in that case weighed immigration policy versus labor policy and decided that immigration policy was more important. So, you can’t do that, and it has to be done hand in hand, basically. ... We’re not saying that the United States should not have an immigration system that it enforces. We’re not saying that at all. What we’re saying is that it has to be done respecting the fact that immigration laws have to be enforced in a way that allows workers to exercise their rights. So, it’s two separate ... bundles of rights, but they need to exist together, and equally.”

Zach: “So ..., would you say that one of the goals of immigration reform that the AFL-CIO is working towards is trying to attempt to make some kind of harmony between these two systems of laws?”

Cathy: “It’s our entire goal. This policy. Yeah.”

When it comes to specific policy positions that individual national unions developed, most agreed that immigrant workers currently living in the United States deserve equal protections with native workers. The general reason behind supporting legalization, family reunification and the abolition of temporary worker programs relates to how they affect the conditions of all workers currently living in the US. Of those that released a statement, practically every one argued that by improving immigrant rights, you fundamentally improve the rights of all. Related to this stance, pro-immigration unions often explicitly
include immigrant workers in their other policy statements, and proudly cite them in their union histories online.¹⁴

**Emphasis on Collaboration:** Strongly related to these efforts at creating a shared identity is the ongoing effort to cultivate consensus concerning immigration among organizations both internal and external to the labor movement. Based on the development of the policy itself, and again through interviews, it seems that the developers were more successful doing this with organizations other than unions. As stated before, Marshall “went all over the country meeting with groups to see if they would support that framework” when he was developing his report (quoted above). In the past, non-union groups interested in worker’s rights, such as socialist political groups or community organizations like churches, often worked with unions in the midst of major organizing drives. These kinds of interconnections were instrumental in major organizing drives, such as the Justice for Janitors campaign. Based on the development of the Unity Plan, it seems the value of these interconnections was not forgotten.

To facilitate this coalition building, policy makers within union organizations framed immigration as a labor issue. This created a common ground with which to advocate for immigration reform across both labor and non-labor organizations. In the Unity Plan, for instance, it states, “immigration reform must fully protect U.S. workers, reduce the exploitation of immigrant workers and reduce employers’ incentive to hire undocumented workers rather than U.S. workers.” Similar rationales come out of statements from individual unions, such as from the UFCW, “America deserves an immigration system that inspires confidence; from our citizens, provides for legal immigration, and ensures that immigration policy protects the life, liberty, and employment prospects of everyone within our borders” (UFCW, 2010). As Cathy (AFL-CIO) describes, labor leaders consciously chose a position that reflected the specific needs of labor, rather than a fully realized immigration policy:

> “Remember that our focus is a piece of immigration, right? It’s really the piece of this entire thing that’s called ‘immigration reform’. We work on the worker pieces. So we don’t work on detention issues, we don’t work on due process issues, but those are just issues that … – it’s not that we don’t care about those – it’s that those are issues that others focus on. So we focus on future flow, we focus on workplace enforcement, we focus on family.”

So there are clearly other issues related to immigration beyond those addressed in this statement, but union leaders made a conscious decision to focus on a part of immigration policy that most directly affects its broader membership. Marshall (2009) makes this explicitly clear in the original EPI Report, “Our focus is on the employment aspects of immigration, which account for only about 15% of U.S. immigrants: refugees account for about 20% and reuniting families for about two-thirds.” This is the

¹⁴ However, while leaders generally agree on current immigrant worker’s rights, greater variation arises in dealing with immigration regulation into the United States. In general, these differences are difficult to assess; however, the silence of many unions, their variation on other issues of immigration, and other clues in interviews suggest differences. For instance, when commenting on the consensus building process, one leader described how “the only union that really resisted the framework was the Border Patrol union. They disagreed with one basic premise … over the answer to the question, ‘do you really need to legalize the unauthorized workers if you had rigorous enforcement of immigration policies?’”
primary reason that he only briefly mentioned family reunification in his Report (unlike in the Unity Plan); it is not explicitly an issue of employment.

By framing immigration in terms of employment, it gave unions a politically legitimate reason to include immigrant workers in their ranks and it explicitly tied immigration reform to other major policy goals, such as the passage of the Employee Free Choice Act.\footnote{The Employee Free Choice Act would allow interested parties to more easily form unions by removing the requirement of secret ballot elections. EFCA proponents allege that employers often intimidate their workers in secret ballot campaigns to an extreme extent.} In terms of offering greater inclusion for immigrant workers, interviewees discussed how dealing with immigration was meant to directly (re)build trust that had been damaged or non-existent for years. Fred (AFL-CIO) describes this when explaining one of the benefits of pursuing reform, “if the AFL-CIO or Change to Win or the labor movement in this country is seen as champion of good immigration reform, it is bound to have a very positive impact on their image within the immigrant communities.” Additionally, leaders argued that reforms on immigration made working conditions better for everyone. By having this two-tiered employment system where unions treated some workers better than others, the standing of all workers suffered, as Isaac (CTW) describes when talking about the relationship with race, “I think the labor movement has always, in some ways, failed to deeply appreciate that having a pool of cheap labor of color that has no protection, undermines those that have protection. ... I mean I like to say ‘America has always had an addiction to poor workers of color.’ ... from slavery to the present. And so I think that the existence of that pool has almost always undermined the rest.”

To reiterate, that unions are making inroads with nonunion labor organizations is significant. The threat of non-union labor organizations to the strength of unions themselves is not lost on many union leaders, who consider it as another form of divide and conquer. For instance, Fine and Tichenor (2009) have been researching the role of worker centers across different communities, but especially among predominantly Latin American neighborhoods. They are in the unique position of being able to support workers without requiring employment; however, they also lack the organizational capacity that unions have earned over more than a century of relevance. Regardless, both in the context of the Unity Plan, and in the context of supporting their members, unions and worker centers are trying to approach these divisions. A leader from a state AFL-CIO explained the careful decision making processes that went into whether or not to affiliate with a local worker center:

“She [the worker center representative] and I sat down, and we had conversations about, you know, how do we work closer together. ... And here is the sticking point which really irritates me, but we’ll get there – her worker center has the ability to affiliate with the labor council. My concern is, and she and I share the same concern, if her worker center joins the labor council, does it create the friction that I lose another affiliate [union]? And I lost ... I lost one fairly large affiliate, and one smaller one, both in the building trades, and both over ... [immigration]. So, you know, you can understand – as we’ve seen with the [US] president – you can stand on principle, and at some point in time, you’ve got to figure out how to actually govern that. And so, this was a situation
where I stood my ground, but I’m not willing to tell her this, that I’m not willing to … throw the baggie and the bath towel down, in order to make it work. So we’ve done some baby steps, to begin to integrate things more.”

On the national level, the AFL-CIO broadly partners with non-union labor organizations, including national organizations like National Day Laborers Organizing Network (NDLON), as well as with local advocacy groups of all kinds. Many of these partnerships occurred recently, however, suggesting a reorientation towards these values of cooperation (the partnership with NDLON, for instance, occurred in 2006).

Union organizations themselves seem to be having mixed results in reconciling differences with each other. On one side, there is evidence of compromise. Seemingly in spite of the EPI Report, national unions and developers of the Unity Plan tweaked certain elements, such as placing greater attention on family reunification and less focus on temporary worker program improvement. Developers of the Unity Plan heavily minimized the provisions on improvement, and some national unions again argued for temporary worker program abolition in their own policies. Specifically, SEIU’s immigration policy statement followed the Unity Plan extremely closely; the UAW and UFCW policies recognized it, but otherwise their authors constructed their own statements; while the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees resolutions made no reference to the Unity Plan at all.

That these policies differ, however, is not evidence that these organizations necessarily disagree with each other; unions must tailor their statements to their unions’ needs, or they risk alienating their members. Mitchell (UA) summarized a common response when asked about these differences in policy priorities:

“Although, you know, I’m sure it varies a little bit from union to union, but most broadly speaking, EFCA [Employee Free Choice Act] was the top labor priority. I think for some of the unions, immigration reform was a fairly close second. I think certainly for some locals, immigration reform matters more because of the nature of their membership, in their local membership and the like.”

For those unions citing their membership for pursuing immigration reform, a new policy was intrinsically related to building the labor movement and increasing the organizing and bargaining power of their union at large. These unions tended to internalize immigrant workers, using phrases like “us”, “our” or “all workers” more frequently in policy statements and interviews. Contrarily, for those unions supporting reform that did not cite their membership, their leaders generally constructed their statements around current events that deserved their solidarity. They tended to use externalizing language, such as “they” and “them”, or that “they deserve better rights”. For instance, the AFT’s resolution was written in support of the workers affected by Arizona’s infamous SB-1070 ruling, which legalized harsh enforcement techniques that could limit immigrant rights across the board.¹⁶ Their

¹⁶ The AFT also released a separate report tracking the harmful effects of teachers emigrating into the US; but that report focused mostly on immigrant teacher recruiters rather than the teachers themselves (AFT, 2010).
resolution also only referenced the harmful effects of bad immigration policy on students and others affected by SB-1070, not explicitly their members.

On the flipside, there was simply not explicit consensus among all national unions, aside from the inferred support suggested by the AFL-CIO’s position. Most importantly, the most common policy position across most unions was none at all. Of the twenty-two unions I initially gathered, only seven published some kind of statement. While some lacked or failed to disclose their political programs, many others highlighted other policy concerns such as improving working conditions, reforming trade policies or dealing with environmental problems. Here, conjecture prevails; silence could mean either support of pro-comprehensive immigration reform, or opposition. Given the lack of proof, history provides the best prediction; conservative unions are still very likely pro-restrictionist (such as the Teamsters) while liberal unions are still very likely pro-reform (such as UNITE HERE).

Interestingly, trade unions never included a statement on immigration, though they still occasionally included information on trade and/or globalization. This may be related to either their ability to protect against the negative effects of immigration through their exclusive organizing model, which precludes the need for a pragmatic immigration policy, or that their historically exclusionary approach has continued, only fading in explicit policy making, but not in culture. Talking with interviewees, building trades unions commonly advocated for the more conservative provisions outlined in the Unity Plan (a worker verification mechanism and border control). Speaking on its development, Cathy (AFL-CIO) contrasted the needs of SEIU with the building trades, “they [SEIU] would have had the enforcement piece look, I think, a little different. On our end, the building trades insisted on inserting the border language, which I think made SEIU a little nervous.”

Attempts at Inclusionary Organizational Strategies: Perhaps the most difficult change that advocates of social movement unionism desire is the fundamental structural transformation of what it means to be a union. In other words, social movement unionism places greater emphasis on grassroots organizing and greater involvement of members, as part of an ideologically determined labor movement. Here, evidence from the development of the Unity Plan, as well as from interviews and other policy statements, seems the most lacking. While leaders of the labor movement were explicitly concerned with supporting the interests of workers, there was little evidence to suggest that leaders were including them in the policy development process.

To be clear, this is not to say that labor leaders exclude workers from organizing efforts or other membership related actions. Like many leaders, Vanessa of CTW described how, “we organize with workers; we don’t organize workers.” This was common: a sense that unions do not come into a workplace and organize for workers, rather they actively engage with workers to help them gain

\[17\] I later conducted a logistic analysis of all national unions to determine other factors which may be important for determining the presence of an immigration policy. In that analysis, the only significant variables were size and the proportion of immigrant workers in the industry and occupation. Specifically, larger unions representing industries and/or occupations of higher proportions of immigrant workers tended to be more likely to have policy positions than the reverse. Again, this demonstrates a pragmatic form of policy development that I have been describing above. This is from my own preliminary analysis, so should not be considered authoritative yet.
whatever they want to achieve. An AFL-CIO representative, speaking about how organizing works locally, stated, “Basically, if the place is being organized, we just try to help. We don’t take it over, whether it is to provide volunteers to march in front of the place with signs or leaflet or do house visits or whatever, we just try to do whatever the union [that] is trying to organize would like U.S. to do.” Union organizers are also aware of the challenges that arise when immigrant workers are present, and are generally prepared when immigration rights advocacy groups are already working with them. “[If there is an organized group [that advocates on behalf of immigrants’ rights] they’ll be very aware. I think where there is no worker center or community based center that can assist, it’s gonna be more difficult, because the biggest obstacle, is still the law. So fear of retribution, reprisal, afraid of being fired ... all of that stuff. I mean that is the really huge thing” (Sarah, AFL-CIO).

Instead, workers were passive agents in the development and application of the Unity Plan itself. In the EPI Report (Marshall, 2009), for instance, Marshall traveled throughout the US, gathering support from union and immigrant rights group leaders throughout the country. Though it was explicitly asked, no interviewee claimed to gather opinions directly from any non-leader, immigrant or otherwise. Yes, the developers of the Unity Plan contacted organizational representatives from groups like La Raza and the NDLON, but in general, the Unity Plan was constructed with immigrant workers in mind, but not in person. Instead, interviewees cited media efforts or broader legislative initiatives designed to garner the attention of immigrant workers. Cathy (AFL-CIO) answers the question of awareness and involvement together, “So, I cannot speak for immigrant workers. I don’t know whether — ... but the no-match lawsuit got tons of publicity, and we did pretty extensive education campaigns as well. So I’m pretty sure immigrant workers know about this. How much are workers involved in this effort? Well, they’re involved in as much as they elected union leadership who, you know, pay for us to do this work.”

Of course, Cathy broaches an important point: how else are immigrant workers supposed to be involved outside of other organizations or their unions? After all, fear of employer or legal reprisal is rampant throughout immigrant communities, especially among undocumented immigrants. Also, by using a representative framework, perhaps union organizations accelerate the construction of new policies. After all, when I asked about how aware most members were of the AFL-CIO’s work on immigration, Fred (AFL-CIO) replied, “probably not much. But then, there are not a whole lot of people that are aware of anything the AFL has done.” But an approach that lacks direct membership involvement, or at minimum an ability to allow for such involvement, precludes any opportunity for those interested workers to actually be involved.

Obviously, recruiting and promoting interested members either from the base or with the requirements of the base in mind to be leaders is still a form inclusion. For instance, Fred (AFL-CIO) described, “I tell any kid that I talk to who is interested in getting involved in the labor movement, to go learn Spanish. If you want employability, and you want to be successful in organizing, go learn Spanish.” New leaders rising from the ranks, having worked in the same industry or gained some basic experience in their represented workplace, may, again, be a more efficient form of getting those workers who are actually interested in policy issues involved in policy development. The extent, however, to which recruitment of leaders that represent minority populations within the labor movement seems to be in question. As
Sarah (AFL-CIO) describes, the recruitment of leaders outside of the labor movement seems to be a growing trend, especially among women,

“There’s definitely a difference in how women look at unions, and men look at unions, and how they’re brought up in them these days. I find an awful lot of people being hired in, with very idealistic notions of what organized labor is. There are those of us who, you know, come through diverse [settings], having like, worked inside of a facility, and gone to union meetings and learned about organized labor through, what I would say, the traditional means indicated in that fashion. We have a different take, and I think we look at things differently than those, who, you know, are fresh out of college, having gotten into it as an organizer, or on the staff, blah blah blah. It’s a whole different mindset. Because there is an appreciation, I think, in medial workplaces, for having done that work, that those men and women did, no matter what color they are.”

Not only does Sarah speak to the differences inherent in the characteristics of leaders with differing goals, but also the cultural differences that separate the leaders themselves. Though out of scope for this paper, the patterns of male domination that permeate throughout union leadership can surely be extended to the kinds of experiences that leaders of other marginalized groups face.

In the end, leaders are trying to best represent their members by reflecting their interests. The quality of their intended actions is not in question here; I make no claim in either direction. Instead, I only call attention to the apparent fact that workers were involved in the development of the Unity Plan only in the sense that they were thought of, but not directly included. Relating the parent-like quality characteristic of this peripheral form of inclusion, Sarah (AFL-CIO) again outlined her frustrations with what she called a “paternalistic attitude” of these leaders when it came to dealing with ethnic groups of any kind,

“We also had this kind of paternalistic attitude toward the workforce. They have to be taken care of. And every once in a while, we get someone who doesn’t want to be taken care of. They want to assert what they know, and how to take care of themselves. ... So I see a lot of caretaking mentality, when it comes down to ethnic minorities in organized labor. ... especially when it comes to [foreign] language minorities ... we still seem to think that [that is okay], [when] other people ... can’t speak the [same] language. Hence [leaders] ignore them.”

**Conclusion**

Despite what the Unity Plan suggests about unions efforts to embody social movement unions, its passage was significant both within the labor movement and in the political arena. Though its development seemed to exclude direct involvement from its members, it marked the culmination of over two decades of consensus building towards a comprehensive immigration policy. They constructed a document that demonstrated the shared political consensus among labor advocates for a policy that marked a reversal of their nativist position of the past, and towards an inclusionary liberal policy emphasizing the right of all residents of the United States to be able to work without fear of deportation.
or discrimination. They have yet to see substantive changes to immigration policy; but with a healthcare bill passed and a new presidential term ahead, congress seems poised to debate immigration once again. This time, national labor leaders are in full agreement on what to do.
Considering that authors construct policy documents with careful consideration of their audience and desired goals, an analysis of these documents further enhances my understanding of the relationship between discourse and framing. I collected official policy statements and membership resolutions, explicitly labeled as such, from a selection of unions. While both documents convey a simple message to the public and to their members, the purposes and audiences of the two types of documents vary, which I considered when analyzing. Policy statements are generally written for a political audience, serving as the backbone for legislative action. Resolutions serve a public audience, but require approval of the membership, hence are more likely to reflect the entire union’s interests and goals. By considering the specific audience, authors alter the presentation of information accordingly, which in turn affects the character of the discourse.

For selecting documents, I considered the organizational differences between the AFL-CIO and CTW, as well as the extensive variability across American unions. Considering time constraints, and my interest in depth over breadth, I gathered documents from eight sources. These include both federations (AFL-CIO and CTW), and six additional unions representing different kinds of unions. For the AFL-CIO, I considered the Unity Plan itself as their main policy document, as it was published on their website (AFL-CIO & CTW, 2009; see also Appendix B). For CTW, I used a statement that was practically identical, but published on their website. The unions and their policies included a policy statement (UFCW, 2010) from the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), broadly representing service workers from multiple industries, but most notably foods; a policy statement (LIUNA, 2007) from the Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA), an industrial union heavily involved in the construction industry; a resolution (AFSCME, 2010) from the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), representing occupations across industries, but remaining almost exclusively in the public sector; a resolution (AFT, 2010) from the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), a mixed trade and industrial union representing mostly professionals with 4-year college degrees; a policy statement (UAW, 2009) from the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers (UAW), representing mostly manufacturing workers; and a policy statement (SEIU, 2010) from the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), a primarily private, service oriented union, and one of the largest, most active and immigrant-rich unions in the country. Also, I considered a report released by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), as the report was of central importance to the development of the Unity Plan itself (Marshall, 2009). Finally, I considered several immigration policy reports published by various union organizations, all of which came from those organizations in some form (see Bibliography). When initially selecting unions, I attempted to separate them into clearly defined analytical categories, but soon found that I could not adequately justify such divisions. For instance, picking one or two broadly representative unions within both the AFL-CIO and CTW was problematic, considering that just four unions make up CTW, while fifty-six make up the AFL-CIO. Instead, I selected unions with considerations of their size, industry, educational requirements, national affiliation, organizational type, etc..

After selecting unions, I considered several other factors before gathering documents. First, I only collected statements post-dating the Unity Plan, considering my interest in understanding its
implementation and adoption across unions. Second, I excluded media releases, reasoning that policy
documents and resolutions underpin the information behind releases and better reflect the discursive
reasoning I gathered from leaders in interviews. Also, if I were to analyze everything released by each of
the eight organizations, including blogs, press releases, or other news items, my project would quickly
become too ambitious. Finally, I gathered documents from websites and through direct requests from
the organizations themselves, with the understanding that public documents are explicitly published to
be public; in other words, I considered audience and purpose inherent in public documents.
Appendix B – The Unity Plan

The Labor Movement’s Framework for Comprehensive Immigration Reform

AFL-CIO and Change to Win, April 2009

Immigration reform is a component of a shared prosperity agenda that focuses on improving productivity and quality; limiting wage competition; strengthening labor standards, especially the freedom of workers to form unions and bargain collectively; and providing social safety nets and high-quality lifelong education and training for workers and their families. To achieve this goal, immigration reform must fully protect U.S. workers, reduce the exploitation of immigrant workers and reduce employers’ incentive to hire undocumented workers rather than U.S. workers. The most effective way to do that is for all workers—immigrant and native-born—to have full and complete access to the protection of labor, health and safety and other laws. Comprehensive immigration reform must complement a strong, well-resourced and effective labor standards enforcement initiative that prioritizes workers’ rights and workplace protections. This approach will ensure that immigration does not depress wages and working conditions or encourage marginal low-wage industries that depend heavily on substandard wages, benefits and working conditions.

This approach to immigration reform has five major interconnected pieces:

1. An independent commission to assess and manage future flows, based on labor market shortages that are determined on the basis of actual need;
2. A secure and effective worker authorization mechanism;
3. Rational operational control of the border;
4. Adjustment of status for the current undocumented population; and
5. Improvement, not expansion, of temporary worker programs, limited to temporary or seasonal, not permanent, jobs.

Family reunification is an important goal of immigration policy and it is in the national interest for it to remain that way. First, families strongly influence individual and national welfare. Families historically have facilitated the assimilation of immigrants into American life. Second, the failure to allow family reunification creates strong pressures for unauthorized immigration, as happened with the IRCA’s amnesty provisions. Third, families are the most basic learning institutions, teaching children values as well as skills to succeed in school, society and at work. Finally, families are important economic units that provide valuable sources of entrepreneurship, job training, support for members who are unemployed and information and networking for better labor market information.

The long-term solution to uncontrolled immigration is to stop promoting failed globalization policies and encourage just and humane economic integration, which will eliminate the enormous social and economic inequalities at both national and international levels. U.S. immigration policy should consider the effects of immigration reforms on immigrant source countries, especially Mexico. It is in our national interest for Mexico to be a prosperous and democratic country able to provide good jobs for most of its adult population, thereby ameliorating strong pressures for emigration. Much of the
Emigration from Mexico in recent years resulted from the disruption caused by NAFTA, which displaced millions of Mexicans from subsistence agriculture and enterprises that could not compete in a global market. Thus, an essential component of the long-term solution is a fair trade and globalization model that uplifts all workers, promotes the creation of free trade unions around the world, ensures the enforcement of labor rights and guarantees core labor protections for all workers.

**Future Flow**

One of the great failures of our current employment-based immigration system is that the level of legal work-based immigration is set arbitrarily by Congress as a product of political compromise—without regard to real labor market needs—and it is rarely updated to reflect changing circumstances or conditions. This failure has allowed unscrupulous employers to manipulate the system to the detriment of workers and reputable employers alike. The system for allocating employment visas—both temporary and permanent—should be depoliticized and placed in the hands of an independent commission that can assess labor market needs on an ongoing basis and—based on a methodology approved by Congress—determine the number of foreign workers to be admitted for employment purposes, based on labor market needs. In designing the new system, and establishing the methodology to be used for assessing labor shortages, the commission will be required to examine the impact of immigration on the economy, wages, the workforce and business.

**Worker Authorization Mechanism**

The current system of regulating the employment of unauthorized workers is defunct, ineffective and has failed to curtail illegal immigration. A secure and effective worker authorization mechanism is one that determines employment authorization accurately while providing maximum protection for workers, contains sufficient due process and privacy protections and prevents discrimination. The verification process must be taken out of the hands of employers, and the mechanism must rely on secure identification methodology. Employers that fail to use the system properly must face strict liability, including significant fines and penalties regardless of the immigration status of their workers.

**Rational Operational Control of Borders**

A new immigration system must include rational control of our borders. Border security is clearly very important, but not sufficient, since 40 to 45 percent of unauthorized immigrants did not cross the border unlawfully but overstayed visas. Border controls, therefore, must be supplemented by effective work authorization and other components of this framework. An “enforcement-only” policy will not work. Practical border controls balance border enforcement with the other components of this framework and with the reality that more than 30 million valid visitors cross our borders each year. Enforcement, therefore, should respect the dignity and rights of our visitors, as well as residents in border communities. In addition, enforcement authorities must understand that they need cooperation from communities along the border. Border enforcement is likely to be most effective when it focuses on criminal elements and engages immigrants and border community residents in the enforcement effort. Similarly, border enforcement is most effective when it is left to trained professional border patrol agents and not vigilantes or local law enforcement officials—who require cooperation from immigrants to enforce state and local laws.
Adjustment of Status for the Current Undocumented Population

Immigration reform must include adjustment of status for the current undocumented population. Rounding up and deporting the 12 million or more immigrants who are unlawfully present in the United States may make for a good sound bite, but it is not a realistic solution. And if these immigrants are not given adequate incentive to “come out of the shadows” to adjust their status, we will continue to have a large pool of unauthorized workers whom employers will continue to exploit to drive down wages and other standards to the detriment of all workers. Having access to a large undocumented workforce has allowed employers to create an underground economy, without the basic protections afforded to U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, and in which employers often misclassify workers as independent contractors, thus evading payroll taxes and depriving federal, state and local governments of additional revenue. An inclusive, practical and swift adjustment-of-status program will raise labor standards for all workers. The adjustment process must be rational, reasonable and accessible, and it must be designed to ensure it will not encourage future illegal immigration.

Improvement, Not Expansion, of Temporary Worker Programs

The United States must improve the administration of existing temporary worker programs, but should not adopt a new “indentured” or “guest worker” initiative. Our country has long recognized that it is not good policy for a democracy to admit large numbers of workers with limited civil and employment rights.
Appendix C – Interview Protocol

The following is the general structure of my interview protocol. Questions were ordered the same regardless of the interview, but questions were presented only if relevant to the interviewee. For instance, Section 2 was only discussed with interviewees that had general leadership positions, and not to those who specialized in immigration. Other questions were included very early in interviews, but were quickly dropped as they were not directly relevant (these were only present in one interview); therefore, they are not included here. Also, since I was the only interviewer, the areas in parentheses were meant as notes for me only, and were not spoken. Finally, in the course of interviews, if an interesting idea arose that was not explicitly covered in the questionnaire, I did not adhere to the script; I always pursued that information before returning to the protocol.

Section 1 - Introduction: confidentiality, recording and general instructions
1. As a reminder, all responses you provide will be stored and reported confidentially. Your demographic information will be stored on a secure server. Your responses are voluntary, without any penalties for unanswered questions. The identifying information for this interview will only be known to you, my principal investigator and myself.
   a. do you understand these tenets of confidentiality?
   b. Do you have any questions concerning confidentiality?

2. In order to accurately analyze and cite this interview, recording is a necessity.
   a. Do you have any questions concerning recording?
   b. Will you allow a recorder for the course of the interview?

<<<RECORDING STARTS HERE>>>}

Section 2 - Role of organization in broader labor movement
3. In the past 5 years, the political environment has also changed dramatically with a new progressive president and Democratic control over the House and Senate in the 2008 election.
   a. How has the political environment affected the labor movement's ability to make significant changes?
   b. Historically, members of the labor movement have considered the Democratic Party a political ally.
      i. Is this the still the case?
      ii. Why/Why not?
   c. Do you think that the AFL-CIO would consider the Democratic Party as a Labor Party?
      i. Other parties?
   d. How would your organization evaluate Obama's presidency as affecting the labor movement?
      i. What were some tangible differences arising from Obama's presidency?
4. Unions, in terms of raw membership, have been declining across most industries. From what I have gathered, the AFL seems to have recognized this, and has adjusted its organizational outlook accordingly. One of the most obvious changes, with Sweeney's election in '95, was when the AFL took a renewed interest in organizing.
   a. Do you agree with the statement before? If no, why?
   b. In terms of attempting to counteract union decline, what were the most important strategic changes made in the last 10 years?
      i. (If there were none) What could have been done differently?
      ii. (If so) Why was this so important?
   c. What led to this change?

5. While the AFL doesn’t directly control organizing in a given workplace, it definitely plays a major role in setting the organizational tone for organizing.
   a. Have organizing strategies changed since before Sweeney’s presidency? In other words, does organizing look differently before '95 than it looks after '95?
      i. What were those changes?
      ii. Why make those changes?
      iii. Were they more effective?
         1. How do you know?
   b. Like I said before, the AFL plays a role in assisting organizing, but doesn’t directly run workplace organizing efforts. Is this true?
      i. (Regardless of response) How does the AFL-CIO contribute to organizing efforts at the local level?
      ii. How well received are your efforts by organizing workers?
         1. (If badly) Why are workers reluctant to work with you?
         2. (If well) Have workers always been willing to work with you?
            a. Elaborate...
   c. Different industries seem to organize at different rates.
      i. How does the AFL-CIO account for these varying rates?

Section 2 - Role of immigration
6. Latino immigrant workers have been organizing in ever greater numbers than in prior decades. The form of organizing seems to be varied, in that there are both formal techniques (NLRB proceedings), informal techniques (outside NLRB proceedings, such as through worker centers), and still other campaigns that utilize any and all types of methods.
   a. Are there different challenges to organize documented and undocumented workers?
   b. What are some of the biggest challenges to organizing documented immigrant workers?
      i. Why?
      ii. How are these challenges approached?
   c. What are some of the biggest challenges to organizing undocumented immigrant workers?
      i. Why?
ii. How are these challenges approached?

d. In the past, the prevailing wisdom was that immigrants were not just hard to organize, they were impossible.

i. What challenges have organizers in the field cited in the past 10 years?

1. KEEP THIS NEARBY! (Language barriers, fears of deportation, cultural differences, etc. (Cited with Milkman, 2006 & 2007; also from Ness, 2005))

2. Do workers or organizers still cite these challenges?
   a. (If yes) Where are they most prevalent?
   b. (If no) What led to this shift in opinion?

ii. From your experience, how do native workers respond to efforts to organize when immigrant workers are involved?

1. What kind of variation is there? In other words, any given set of workers will obviously differ from other sets. How wide is this variation, and how do you work with workers on either side of the spectrum (ie, how do you work with friendly native workers v. unfriendly)?
   a. Elaborate...

2. Are immigrant workers easier or harder to organize than native workers?
   a. Why?

iii. What disagreements are there among local AFL-affiliated unions in regards to organizing immigrant workers?

1. Is this an industry-specific difference, or is it more based on individual differences?
   a. Elaborate...

2. How have these disagreements been resolved?

e. Are immigrant workers aware of these organizing efforts?

i. How involved are immigrant workers?

1. Are they relatively more involved than native workers?

f. I mentioned both informal and formal techniques for organizing among immigrant workers.

i. Which method is preferred? (and why?)

7. In April of 2009, the AFL-CIO and CTW formed a joint policy agreement advocating for immigration reform.

a. What led to the formation of this agreement?

b. Why form such an agreement?

c. Various publically available releases suggest that, prior to this agreement, CTW was more interested in legalization of current immigrants, while the AFL-CIO was most interested in the elimination or freezing of guest worker programs. (Cited from USA Today, Jessie Holland, 2007)

i. Is this still the case?

ii. What other differences are there?

iii. What accounts for these differences?
1. Are these differences significant in broader movement functioning?
2. How do you reconcile these differences?

d. The AFL-CIO has released several statements like this in the past. KEEP NEARBY, FOR REFERENCE ((April 2009 Statement seems to be different in at least 2 areas: 1. the level of agreement between (ORG) and (ORG) and 2. the level of publicity it received.))
   i. What were some of the most important differences in this statement, relative to others?

e. What were some of the most important outcomes of this statement?
   i. What has come besides immigration law reform?
   ii. Were these outcomes expected?
      1. Which were/weren't
   iii. How do you know that these outcomes were related to this statement

f. What disagreements were there among the member unions of the AFL-CIO or your organization in regards to immigration reform?
   i. Why were there differences across unions?
      1. Like organizing, was there a pattern to how these looked?
   ii. How were these disagreements resolved?

g. This agreement was published during a particular political period when Obama was under substantial pressure to address immigration reform immediately.
   i. How closely was the release strategically linked to this time period?

h. To what extent do you think immigration reform will improve overall movement strength for the AFL-CIO?
   i. What kind of effect will it have on current workers?
      1. Will they generally oppose or generally agree?

8. Legal immigration reform seems to be a major goal with the AFL, with several efforts to push different immigration laws through congress in the past 5 years. The efforts in the summer of 2007 and the victory over the "No-Match" rule later on are two such examples.
   a. What are the major benefits of pushing for immigration reform?
   b. How much of a priority is immigration reform for the AFL relative to other efforts?
   c. How does immigration reform affect the success of these other goals?
      i. How do reform efforts affect the ability to organize immigrant workers?
   d. How would the potential passage of the Employee Free Choice Act affect immigrant worker organizing?
      i. How important is this bill relative to an immigration bill for organizing immigrant worker?
   e. Clearly, the relatively recent immigration enforcement legislation out of Arizona had a major impact on immigration policy in general.
      i. Based on your experience, what could come out of this legislation?
      ii. In general, how has this affected organizing efforts?

9. Immigrant workers are in a precarious legal position. These varied immigration reform efforts,
coupled with ICE raids have created an unfriendly environment for organizing and labor reform.

a. Has the AFL played a role in attempting to minimize immigration raids, at least in the past few years?
   i. What has it done?
   ii. Has it been effective?
      1. How do you know?

b. Are immigrant workers aware of these legal efforts?
   i. How involved are immigrant workers in these efforts?
   ii. How much do immigrant workers factor into future strategies for increasing union density?

c. Is the legal separation of labor rights from citizenship/immigration rights an organizing goal?
   i. (If yes) Why such focus on this federal law discrepancy?
      1. How does the AFL traverse the ideological landscape between labor law and immigration enforcement law? In other words, how can you talk about these issues as if they are mutually exclusive issues?
         a. Related to this discrepancy, is it possible to politically separate these issues.
            i. If so, how?
            ii. If not, why not?
         b. Why is it beneficial to separate these issues politically?
            ii. (If no) Maybe some elaboration, based on what they say, but likely just move on...

10. In the past, the AFL-CIO and CTW seem to have had mixed opinions over at least a few issues. These differences seem to have been mitigated since the initial separation in 2005, but the existence of two national labor organizations suggests that there is not necessarily a parallel, shared opinion.
   a. How has this relationship changed since the initial split?
      i. Have these changes been reflected among local unions?
   b. Is there a benefit to having two national organizations concerned with labor issues?
      i. (if yes or no), why?
   c. What is expected in the future for these organizations?

Section 4 - Wrap up
11. Thank you for the interview, and answering these questions.
   a. Are there any issues that have come up that I already asked about that you would like to further elaborate upon?
   b. Is there anything I missed in the interview that you would like to discuss?

   <<<RECORDING STOPS HERE>>>
d. Can you recommend anyone?

e. *(If so)* can you give him/her/them my information, to let him/her/them know to contact me?

12. There are a few documents that you can receive for further information, if you would like.

a. Would you like to receive a copy of the transcript from this interview?
   i. *(If so)*, I will need to keep your name on the transcription, until after I send you the transcript. After I send the transcript, your name will be permanently removed from the interview. May I temporarily attach your name to the interview?

b. Would you like to receive a copy of this research upon completion?
   i. *(If so)*, I will need to keep your name on a list of other interested respondents stored separate from interview responses. Is this okay with you?

13. Do you have any additional questions or concerns?
Appendix D – Acronyms

AMERICAN UNIONS
AFSCME – American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
AFT – American Federation of Teachers
LIUNA – Laborers' International Union of North America
SEIU – Service Employees International Union
UFCW – United Food and Commercial Workers
UAW – International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, aka United Auto Workers
UFWA – United Farm Workers of America
UNITE HERE – Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees and Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
AFL – American Federation of Labor
CIO – Congress of Industrial Organizations
CTW – Change to Win
EPI – Economic Policy Institute
NAACP – National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NDLON – National Day Laborers Organizing Network
NLRB – National Labor Relations Board
UA – Unaffiliated

OTHER TERMS
DREAM Act – Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act
EFCA – Employee Free Choice Act
IRCA – Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement
SB-1070 – Senate Bill 1070 from Arizona
ARTICLES & BOOKS


Baumgart, 37 of 39


POLICY DOCUMENTS AND ORGANIZATION REPORTS


